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I. INTRODUCTION 
Information is strength—knowledge is power. 
   Anonymous 
 
The Internet has created the perfect anonymous environment for anyone with 
access to a personal computer and a phone line to manipulate, search, and organize 
incredible amounts of information in a span of minutes and communicate with anyone 
else in the infosphere at the same time. Near total anonymity for anyone is possible 
through the use of free email hosting sites, anonymizer sites, and the thousands of cyber 
cafés around the world that offer cheap Internet access to anyone who can pay for a cup 
of coffee. Add the availability of virtually unbreakable encryption, and the Internet 
provides an ideal covert command and control communications network. Most 
importantly, the terrorists of the world know this. 
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, testified to Congress that they 
had evidence that al Qaeda was using the Internet for command and control since 1998 
(Tenet, 2000). He went on to further say, 
terrorists also are embracing the opportunities offered by recent leaps in 
information technology. To a greater and greater degree, terrorist groups, 
including Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and Bin 
Ladin's al Qaeda organization are using computerized files, e-mail, and 
encryption to support their operations (Tenet, 2000) 
It is highly probable the Internet was a source of operational data and the primary 
means of command and control for al Qaeda. Somehow, they managed to keep their 
communications and specific plans from U.S. intelligence services for more than five 
years prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001 (“Terror Plot”, 2001). This is not to say 
that al Qaeda executed everything perfectly nor did their people keep quiet during 
questioning following other terrorist attacks. In fact, the U.S. received warnings as early 
as 1995 about terrorists taking flight lessons in the U.S. with the intent to hijack an 
aircraft and, in one example, crash it into the CIA building in Washington, D.C.  But for 
some reason the U.S. intelligence agencies failed to share and collaborate on this 
information and “connect the dots” to prevent the September 11th attacks (“September 11 
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warnings”, 2002). Nor did they step up their monitoring of al Qaeda activity on the 
Internet. 
Most people would be shocked at the kind and amount of information available 
on the Internet. But the information in and of itself is not the problem. The problem is the 
ease of gathering detailed information on virtually any subject or profession. Internet 
search engines find and compile the data, then the terrorists put the data into context, and 
use it to gain an operational advantage. A small sample of the kind of information 
available is found in Table 1. It lists the web sites, information available on each site, and 
how it could have helped terrorists plan the attack. 
The ability of al Qaeda to gather operational information, covertly communicate, 
and transfer funds using hawalas (an ancient Middle Eastern financial network built on 
trust), should be a wake up call to America of the importance of connectivity.  
Table 1.   Planning web sites. 
Web Site Information Potential Use 
Airline Flying Schedules Synchronize Attack 
 Seat Assignment Sit near critical areas of aircraft like 
crew cabin door and galleys 
FAA Flight Progress Command and Control of supporting 
activities 
 Flight Routes Time route timetables to hijack 
planes 
 Approach Plates Hijacker to follow normal flight path 
(i.e., to Washington Reagan) 
Aeroplanner Flight planning 
information 
Create full plans and calculate flight 
times and turn around points 
Defense Link Pentagon Layout Decide which side to attack 
 Briefing times, etc. Greater terror impact 
Architectural World Trade Center 
Construction Details 
Able to determine where and how to 
hit the structure based on 
construction 
White House Announced Briefings Could time attack to ensure President 
was in residence 
 
A. THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE IS NOW 
What war will look like in the information age has been greatly debated over the 
past 15 years. Visions of future warfare run the spectrum from a highly automated 
3 
version of today, with more unmanned equipment, to a world where the military is only 
involved on the periphery as individuals, large commercial conglomerates, and other 
organizations fight over ideas and knowledge. And many authors still describe the advent 
of information warfare as a point sometime in the distant future. But Arquilla and 
Ronfedt mention that a type of information warfare, netwar, has been occurring for years 
now, it just hasn’t been classified as such. They offer Radio and TV Martí broadcasts 
from America to Cuba and the pro-Cuban press as an example of the battle of ideas in the 
infosphere (Arquilla & Ronfedt, 1997, p. 28).  
In the future, information will rise in importance to a point where “the possession 
and manipulation of information itself can be a key element of the war-winning equation” 
(Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Aug 1998). The Chinese demonstrated their 
understanding of this principle when they created a three dimensional graphic depicting 
an aggressive EP-3 turning into a passive Chinese fighter and released it to the world 
within 24 hours after the incident. The U.S. was then left to explain the video away. 
Consider the amount of time and effort the U.S. spent refuting it. What would world 
opinion have been if the U.S. had released a short video or simulation first? Or even at 
the same time? It is imperative for the U.S. to develop an understanding of information 
warfare, draft the appropriate doctrine, and reorganize or create new organizations in 
response to the challenges of information warfare.  
James Adams and John Alexander both define information warfare as made up of 
three pieces: perception management, system destruction, and information exploitation. 
Each views and uses information differently:  “perception management where the 
information is the message, systems destruction where the information is the medium, 
and information exploitation where information is an opponent’s resource to be targeted” 
(1998, p. 17; 1999, pp. 105-112).  Although both Adams and Alexander use the same 
model to describe information warfare, they have divergent views on what methods could 
or should be employed in the future. Reviewing and contrasting their views will provide 
the spectrum of potential futures in information warfare.  
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1. Perception Management 
Perception management is going to be a critical element in future conflicts in the 
infosphere, but the question is how is it accomplished with the greatest effect and 
minimum risk of severe blowback.  Alexander advocates using the traditional tools of 
perception management, psychological operations (PSYOP) and deception, to “win 
hearts and minds.” This would be achieved through the manipulation of and planned 
deception through the commercial media, military psychological operations, and the 
Internet to get into and affect minds of our supporters, partners, and enemies (Alexander, 
1999, p. 111).   
Adams, on the other hand, believes the flow of information in today’s networked 
world cannot be controlled and warns of the consequences of trying to do so.  He believes 
“what should and could be done is to design a new architecture that uses cyberspace and 
the information revolution to help prosecute warfare”.  Adams feels any acts of deception 
have a “limited shelf life” and it would be much better to “tell the unvarnished truth, 
which has no sell-by date.” He argues that the military has to look at unique solutions to 
emerging situations.  For example, rather than targeting the leader of an adversarial 
country, exploit the opportunities to reach the regular people on the street.  Use all 
avenues of information to give alternatives to the tightly controlled broadcast and print 
media available in most countries. Convince them why it would be better to change, and 
if you do it right, they will. Understanding how this kind of information operation could 
impact “the conduct of military and foreign policy, is something very few in government 
possess”, but is a key to future military conflicts in the information age (Adams, 1998, 
pp. 274-286). 
Adams is correct in saying that false or deceptive information may create a 
complex situation that is worse than the original conflict. We should change our doctrines 
to address the “man on the street” and provide him with the truth so he can make an 
informed decision and act upon it if possible. The only shortcoming in Adam’s concept is 
the lack of the integration of all the tools of perception management. 
 It is important to realize that directed information campaigns aren’t the only ways 
to engage in perception management. Everything our government does sends one 
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message or another to our own citizens and the rest of the world. The goal is to anticipate 
the message an activity will send and make sure it is in alignment with existing policy. 
For example, consider the message sent by then U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno when 
she authorized an Immigration and Naturalization Service SWAT team to capture Elian 
Gonzales, a 6-year-old boy, at 4 o’clock in the morning. The picture in Figure 1 was 
worldwide on the Internet within 2 hours along with harrowing reports of armed officers 
in combat gear breaking into a small house and pointing a loaded machine gun at the 
head of the boy. One can only imagine the damage this act and the associated picture did 
to the perception of America as the home of the free and brave. Could it have also 
shattered many Americans’ belief that our government protects innocent people?  This is 
the kind of question we need to ask ourselves before every operation so that we continue 
to project the mental picture we want the world to have of the United States. 
  
Figure 1.   Elian Gonzalez Capture. Photograph taken by A. Diaz, the Washington Post, 
April 22, 2000. Available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp%2Ddyn/photo 
/topstory/G61939%2D2000Apr22.html 
2. System Destruction 
Systems destruction is the part of information warfare that targets the actual 
systems used to transmit and store the information or what is commonly called “the 
information grid.” It is an “interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, 
associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and 
managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel” 
(Miller, Jefferson, & Rogers, 2001, ¶ 6). The grid allows commanders to efficiently 
collect, process, and disseminate critical information to his forces, but as he becomes 
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reliant on the grid, the grid becomes a center of gravity that the enemy can target (Libicki 
& Shapiro, 1999).  
While destruction is the easiest function to understand, it is not always required to 
render an information grid useless. Each node of an information grid or network is built 
with nodes, like routers, that require software to work properly. It is possible to implant 
malicious code or viruses in these nodes to slow the network down, delete data, or cause 
the entire network to crash.  This type of destruction or disruption can also happen at a 
much smaller scale.  
Today’s smart weapons are computerized marvels that use sophisticated logic to 
leverage onboard electronic maps and global positioning system (GPS) signals to 
pinpoint their target. Imagine the operational impact and campaign disruption if an 
enemy infected those systems with viruses or malicious code, and then at a critical 
moment in combat activated the virus to render a fighter aircraft, a tank, or an entire ship 
useless.  The Navy got a taste of this potential when a Petty Officer accidentally entered a 
zero into a database causing the ship’s local area network to crash, shutting down all 
propulsion and leaving the U.S.S. Yorktown dead in the water for three hours (Slabodkin, 
1998). While embedded viruses in weapons are a frightening concept, imagine how 
recent conflicts may have changed if the U.S. could have rendered U. S. produced 
weapons and systems useless when they were used against U. S. interests or forces 
(Alexander, 1999). Or imagine the consequences if foreign software in U.S. systems 
“blew up” when used. 
Adams looks beyond the “virus in a weapon” tool and is concerned that 
information technology is moving into every aspect of a military’s capability to wage 
war, from new individual sensing body armor to miniature unmanned combat vehicles to 
massive “intelligent” databases assisting in command and control decisions. These 
developing technologies improve the ability to efficiently manage information and 
deliver force where needed but come at a price, security.  The military now relies 
exclusively on commercially developed technology and develops little specialized 
technology. It is cheaper and sometimes quicker to use off the shelf technology, but both 
the hardware and software is vulnerable to manipulation because of the vast numbers of 
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people involved in its design, production and support. Many software companies use 
offshore programming houses in India, Singapore, and Russia, and most hardware is 
produced and assembled outside the United States. Unfortunately, this reliance on the 
commercial sector will continue to present an information assurance problem, especially 
in the areas of miniaturization and automation (Adams, 1998).  
3. Information Exploitation 
Targeting an opponent’s operational information, or any form of information, to 
gain advantage is the third piece of the IW puzzle, information exploitation. Like leading 
U.S. businesses, the military compiled and automated its massive databases in an attempt 
to reduce the “fog and friction” on the battlefield and gain information superiority.  This 
centralization of data for command and control is both a boon and a bane.  It allows 
leaders to monitor the battlefield in a level of detail never before imagined.  
The common relevant operational picture (CROP) provides the “big picture” of 
what is happening in very near real time to the senior leadership at all levels and can be 
used to guide the war. The CROP depends on interoperable systems and the integrated 
databases, which may now be targets themselves. There are two ways these databases 
could be corrupted. One way an adversary could access the databases would be through 
backdoors programmed into the base code of the operating systems. A second way would 
be to brake into the CROP servers and enter bad data or change the data linkages within 
the database code. Either could cause the entire system-of-systems could crash like the 
U.S.S. Yorktown mentioned earlier, but someone would have to break into our secure 
networks to do this. Firewalls, updated software, encryption, biometrics, and other 
network security measures should keep the data secure. The key assumption is should.  
Breaking into secure networks isn’t as hard as it used to be. The explosion of the 
numbers of personal computers, the computational power of the newest processors, free 
system administration/hacking programs on the Internet, and commercially available 
network administration/component training all lower the cost of entry and allow nearly 
anyone to become a dangerous hacker.  Business and military leaders need to understand 
that hackers are no longer bored kids looking for some excitement (Adams, 1998).  They 
are sophisticated systems operators with specific network knowledge who can enter some 
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of the most secure networks through holes in even the newest security programs. Once 
inside, they can gain root access and do anything on or to the network (Alexander, 1999).   
If hackers can get into a network to just fool around or post a costly but harmless 
mail-replicating virus, think of the potential damage they pose to essential and sensitive 
data. If a hacker can do it, so can an adversary. They could use the same techniques to 
enter your network and either gather information (computer network exploitation (CNE)) 
or place malicious code to crash the network (computer network attack (CNA)).  
B. THESIS OVERVIEW—SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the idea that a national information 
strategy would enhance the effectiveness and breadth of military information operations. 
To fully explore this concept, this thesis will take the following steps. First, it will 
examine a sample current information operations theory to establish a general foundation 
for thinking about information operations. Next, it will suggest a planning methodology 
derived from the foundation information and discuss the linkage of the plan to national 
strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Then the thesis will compare the current 
war on terrorism to the planning methodology and strategy linkages to validate them and 
evaluate the first months of the IO war effort. Finally, the thesis will conclude with a net 
appraisal of the benefits to military information operations of a national information 
strategy and suggest further areas of research.  
C. KEY CONCEPTS 
Before starting the study of the potential benefits of a national information 
strategy, we must first establish a basic conceptual foundation. To do this, the following 
questions will be answered. What is information and why is it important? What are 
information operations? Why are information operations used? And finally, why a 
national military information strategy? The answers to these questions set the stage for 
the study and provide a common conceptual frame of reference and key term definitions. 
1. What is information and why is it important? 
The core concept for the entire theory of information operations is information. 
This may sound tautological, but we should discuss what is and isn’t information. We 
will use the cognitive hierarchy found in Joint Publication (JP) 6-0 as a basis of our 
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discussion with one modification (see Figure 2). We will use the broader definition of 
information found in JP 1-02 and use information as the foundation of our IO information 
pyramid and work our way up to understanding. 
Figure 2.   The IO Information Pyramid. 
The joint definition of information (see Figure 3) highlights the difference 
between the two accepted definitions. The first is more “physical” because facts, data, 
and instructions can be “collected,” where the second definition speaks to the fact that 
information doesn’t exist unless a human assigns a meaning to it. This may be splitting 
hairs, but think of this. An object like a computer chip is placed in front of two people, 
one is from the mountains of Tibet and the other from Germany. Assuming the person 
from Tibet has never seen a chip before, he would assign a different meaning to the 
object than “computer chip.” Assuming the German has seen one before, he would 
recognize it and define it as a chip. Both would have the right “information” in their own 
context. Information is the facts, data, and instructions, but more importantly it is also 










Figure 3.   Definition of Information 
People and organizations in the modern world are inundated with thousands of 
bits and pieces of information a day. They have to look at each one, give it meaning, and 
then apply mental processes to compare, contrast, and validate the information and act 
upon it. For example, you read in the newspaper that Sears is having a tire sale. You 
immediately think: 1) do I need tires? 2) if yes, where did I buy my last set? 3) do I trust 
Sears? 4) do others have better deals?…you get the idea. This multi-step analysis of 
information is similar to the processes the military uses to cull intelligence from 
information (see Figure 4). It is important to remember the difference between 
information and intelligence. 
Figure 4.   Definition of Intelligence. 
Unfortunately the differences aren’t always appreciated or understood, especially 
by the military operational community. Intelligence strives for accuracy while many 
sources of information are more focused on timeliness. News organizations like the Cable 
News Network (CNN) have expanded their reach into the crevices of the world to such a 
degree that almost any event can be globally transmitted within 15 minutes of its 
occurrence. This far exceeds the military’s ability to gather and process information into 
intelligence. And this gap will never close because the military will never have perfect 
 
Information: 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2.
The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known
conventions used in their representation. (Joint Publication 1-02) 
Intelligence: 1. The product resulting from the collection, 
processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of 
available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. 
Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through 
observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint 
Publication 1-02) 
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intelligence sources to verify data as it occurs. And the cost of error is very low for news 
organizations because they can retract a story or breaking headline, unlike a country that 
many not be able to recall or disable a missile or a bomb once it has been launched. 
The next level of the information pyramid is knowledge. Knowledge is derived 
from information that has been tested and accepted as factual. This is accomplished 
through cognition where unverified information is received, mentally assessed and tested 
using perception, reasoning, or intuition before the information is accepted as fact. 
Commanders must ensure that they are dealing with facts and not just their beliefs. Once 
they have the facts, they can gain an understanding of the situation by using their 
judgment to put their newfound knowledge into context. “Ideally, understanding a 
situation supports a commander in battlefield visualization and creates the conditions 
from which plans can be formed and effective actions taken” (U.S. Army Field Manual 
(FM) 100-6, 1996, p.2-1). 
The importance of understanding to military operations has been widely discussed 
by classic military strategists. Clausewitz was skeptical of the value of “knowing” in 
battle because he felt intelligence was often contradictory, its accuracy was questionable , 
and it just added “friction” (Clausewitz, 1832/1873). But Sun Tzu and Jomini on the 
other hand, felt good intelligence about an enemy’s plans greatly enhanced the chance for 
success in battle, all other things being equal. But, the more an enemy understands about 
your previous plans, existing forces, history, operational doctrine, cultural biases, etc., the 
easier it will be for him to anticipate or counter your operations. So the goal is to find out 
as much information about your opponent while preventing him gathering information 
about you.  
2. What are Information Operations? 
Information operations are defined as the “actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems while defending one’s own information and 
information systems” (JP 1-02, p. 211). But the expanded definition presented in FM 
100-6, Information Operations, better explains the intent of military information 
operations:  
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Information operations integrate all aspects of information to accomplish 
the full potential for enhancing the conduct of military operations. 
Information operations are not new. In their simplest form they are the 
activities that gain information and knowledge and improve friendly 
execution of operations while denying an adversary similar capabilities by 
whatever possible means. (1996, p. iv) 
Additionally, there is some confusion in current literature on IO over the 
relationship between information operations and information warfare. According to 
current Joint doctrine, Information warfare (IW) is a subset of IO, not vice versa. IW is 
limited to times of crisis or conflict to achieve a specific objective against a specific 
target (JP 1-02, p. 211) using primarily offensive IO capabilities. As we will discuss later, 
IO describes the larger picture and embraces both defensive and offensive capabilities.   
3. Why are Information Operations used? 
Information operations contribute to the integration of the military element of 
national power with the other elements to achieve national objectives. The 17 IO 
capabilities and related activities (see Figure 5) can support U.S. strategic engagement 
policy throughout the range of military operations (JP 3-13, p. I-10). The effectiveness of 
deterrence, power projection, and other strategic concepts is greatly affected by the 
ability of the United States to influence the perceptions and decision making of others. In 
times of crisis, IO can help deter adversaries from initiating actions detrimental to the 
interests of the United States or its allies and/or coalition partners. Consider the 
effectiveness and the “message sent” to the Chinese when the U.S. sent 12 ships 
including two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits during a Chinese military exercise in 
1996. This event of gunboat diplomacy sent both China and Taiwan a message: “to 
China…don't overplay your hand [and] for Taiwan…The U.S. will back you -- to a 
point” (McIntyre, 1996).   
If carefully conceived, coordinated, and executed, IO can make an important 
contribution to defusing crises; reducing periods of confrontation and enhancing the 
impact of informational, diplomatic, economic, and military efforts; and forestalling or 
eliminating the need to employ forces in a combat situation. Thus IO, at both the 
national-strategic and theater-strategic levels, requires close coordination among 
numerous elements of the U.S. government, to include the Department of Defense.  
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Figure 5.   Information Operations Capabilities and Related Activities. From Joint 
Publication 3-13, Information Operations, October 9, 1998, p. 1-10. 
4. Why a National Information Strategy? 
Conflict in the infosphere is a series of actions to win the “battle of the story” and 
affect how the world perceives an event. The “battle of the story” involves more than 
how the event is portrayed or “spun” by the participants. It involves all of the 
motivational, emotional, and political methods used by a country, a representative group, 
or even an individual to present their perspective and to justify their actions in a given 
situation to the world at large. The battle can take place in any information medium from 
the Internet to coffee house discussions and college campus rallies to CNN investigative 
reports.  The U.S. historically responds cautiously to any event using public affairs 
releases and press conferences, presenting only evidentiary information about an event; 
and if offensive information operations are required, the U.S. will engage in the computer 
network operations (CNO) of attack and exploitation. 
Public affairs (PA) and CNO may be applicable during the initial stages of a 
conflict, but they don’t represent all the information operation tools the U.S. could use in 
a situation.  There are many other IO tools available to assist the U.S. as a crisis or 
situation develops, but they are frequently overlooked. There is no familiar model or 
comprehensive plan of how to use all of the IO tools in a response to an event. Both of 
these shortfalls could be addressed with a national information strategy.  
A national information strategy would outline how the U.S. government and all of 
its agencies and departments react to event and identify what information capabilities 
could be mobilized. It would provide direction to the proactive planning of IO and 
provide guidance when responding to a crisis. The national strategy would have to be 
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flexible, scalable and adaptable to address different situations. At its core, the strategy 
should consider: 1) the message to be passed, 2) the intended audience, 3) the unintended 
audience, 4) how to pass the message, and 5) how to prevent an opponent from doing the 
same with their message.  
The foundation of the information strategy is the message. A single, coordinated 
message to the world builds credibility internationally because the position of the United 
States on a particular issue has been made clear by all of its agencies. It can be 
embarrassing to a nation when an important message is clouded by misperceptions. A 
recent example occurred when President Bush spoke on how dedicated the United States 
was going to be in the pursuit of international terrorists; he “described America's war on 
terrorism as a ‘crusade,’ a term that has an extremely negative historical connotation 
throughout the Islamic world” (Carpenter, 2001). The term crusade represents a period of 
195 years of war with “alien intruders who were bent on senseless destruction” (Haddah, 
1993). Muslim historians see “the crusaders as courageous but unrestrained and often 
treacherous warriors. They find support for this conclusion in such acts as the reckless 
murder of the civilians, the capture of Muslim women and children, the confiscation 
of property, and--most symbolic of all--the conversion of Muslim mosques into 
churches” (Haddah, 1993). From this perspective, it is easy to understand why the 
Muslim world responded so vehemently when the President of the greatest western power 
used the term.  
This error in perception management vividly demonstrates the importance of 
identifying and crafting a message considering both the intended and unintended 
audiences. Although the President’s speech was meant to reassure, his “reference to a 
‘crusade’ against terrorism, which passed almost unnoticed by Americans, rang alarm 
bells in Europe. It raised fears that the terrorist attacks could spark a 'clash of 
civilizations' between Christians and Muslims, sowing fresh winds of hatred and 
mistrust” (Ford, 2001). The intended audience understood what the President was trying 
to say, but the rest of the world received quite a different message.  To recover from this 
misstep, the President and many European leaders spent most of the following days to 
reassuring the worldwide Muslim community (Ford, 2001). 
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The negative reaction to America’s “crusade” could have been avoided if 
policymakers had taken the time to determine who was going to listen to the message and 
crafted it differently (i.e., eschewed the notion of “crusading”). U.S. policymakers must 
consider all of the countries, organizations, groups and people who have an interest in the 
issue at hand and how they may react. While it would be impossible for policy makers to 
consider every last person, it is possible to identify groups of people at a macro level. 
This would simplify the analysis, but at a risk. If the groupings are too large and represent 
too many different types of people, the analysis may fail to show the subtle effects of 
specific information tools.  With the risk of oversimplification in mind, the community 
interested in the war on terrorism was broken into six groups for this analysis:  the 
terrorists (currently al Qaeda), the Taliban, the Afghan population, other Islamic states, 
the non-allied world, allies of the U.S., and the U.S. population. While it may not be 
possible to craft a message that pleases all these audiences, an understanding of or an 
estimated reaction to the message should prevent strategic information gaffes.   
Identifying the message, both the intended and unintended audiences, and the 
means to transmit the message are only the first half of a complete strategy. The second 
half is figuring out how to use all the available IO tools (see Figure 5). This would 
prevent an opponent from fully executing their information strategy while allowing the 
U.S. to execute its own information strategy and protect its IO infrastructure. Or more 
simply, how the U.S. could achieve information superiority. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Now with a basic understanding of information operations and its key concepts, 
we will focus on a few additional concepts that are critical in our examination of the 
benefits of a national information strategy: how IO can be used, how it can be planned, 
and how it has been used in recent conflicts. Chapter II addresses the first question, how 
IO can be used. It defines each of the 17 IO elements, discusses the potential synergy in 
multi-element campaigns, and applies the elements to various levels of war. Chapter III 
offers a methodology for planning information operations and outlines the linkages to 
strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Chapter IV attempts to validate the 
planning methodology and its associated linkages by evaluating America’s response to 
the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the resulting war on terrorism. How the world’s 
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remaining superpower reacted to al Qaeda, a non-state actor, may provide some 
interesting insights into the limitations and opportunities of asymmetric of information 
operations.   
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the concepts of information operations and 
suggests an answer to the question of whether a national information operations strategy 
would be beneficial to the conduct of military information operations or not. Further, it 
proposes a conceptual methodology for developing a national information strategy and 
closes by proposing a number of questions for further research toward this goal.  
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II. HOW ARE INFORMATION OPERATIONS USED? 
We must first understand what information operations are and where they fit in 
military theory to determine how best to use them. One of the most confusing concepts is 
the use of the term “information operations.” Is it a single entity or a general category of 
military activity, like “naval operations”? According to current joint doctrine, it is the 
latter. Information operations are a group of 17 capabilities (see Fig. 6) that allow a 
commander to meet the requirements of protecting his own information and information 
systems while affecting an adversary’s information and information systems (JP 3-13, p. 
I-10). Each capability is targeted to a specific area of the infosphere and has unique 
benefits and associated risks. 
Figure 6.   Information Operations Capabilities and Related Activities. From Joint 
Publication 3-13, Information Operations, October 9, 1998, p. I-10. 
In this chapter, we will discuss how the capabilities relate to each other, and what 
area of the infosphere each IO capability targets or defends. The chapter will conclude 
with an analytical concept of information operations as a whole and how it applies to the 
three levels of war.  
A. INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS A SUM OF ITS ELEMENTS 
Current joint doctrine splits information operations into two general areas, 
defensive and offensive information operations. Defensive information operations (DIO) 
are the information capabilities used to protect your own information and information 
systems, while offensive information operations (OIO) are the actions that attack or 
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exploit an adversary’s information or information systems. Dividing capabilities into 
these two categories seems a sound approach. However these categories are limited, 
because they do not provide enough granularity for decision makers to select specific IO 
capabilities to use for a type of target.  
Using a concept analogous to a computer’s hardware and software components, 
Arquilla suggests DIO and OIO be broken down into those capabilities that affect 
information technology (hardware) and those that affect how people use their brain, or 
“wetware,” to collect, sort, process, and act on information (software) (2001). We will 
label these four new subcategories of information operations as information assurance 
(DIO versus technology), “wetware” standardization (DIO versus mental processes), 
denial/disruption/destruction operations (OIO versus technology), and perception 
management (OIO versus mental processes). This new categorizing scheme, shown in 
Figure 7, should provide a sufficient level of granularity for our purposes. 
 














Figure 7.   Initial IO Matrix. From seminar on “Conflict in the Information Age”, by John 
Arquilla, March 2001. 
During the course of this analysis, we may find some of the 17 IO capabilities 
overlap the four new categories. This highlights the duality of some of the IO capabilities 
and the need for an analytical approach that identifies the overlaps.  We will start by 
looking at the defensive IO categories and then move on to the offensive ones. 
1. Information Assurance 
The first defensive quadrant contains the capabilities used to protect your own 
information and information systems, commonly known as Information Assurance (IA) 
(see Figure 8). IA is defined as “information operations (IO) that protect and defend 
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authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities” (U.S. Government Services Administration, 1996). 
Figure 8.    Elements of Information Assurance (DIO vs. technology). 
The first capability in IA is physical security. IA is simply the protection of 
information processing equipment, data, and facilities used to process information. One 
of the best ways to protect systems is to limit physical access to a computer, a router, or 
network link (CISCO, 2001). Access controls become more complex and redundant as 
the sensitivity of the information processed increases. They can start out simple, like 
locking classified hard drives in a safe, and move to the extreme, like working in a sealed 
environment with guards and biometric identification systems.  
The next IA capability is data management and standardization. Data 
management is “the control of data handling operations--such as acquisition, analysis, 
translation, coding, storage, retrieval, and distribution of data--but not necessarily the 
generation and use of data” (U.S. Government Services Administration, 1996). To make 
this easier and more efficient, the data should be standardized across the organization to 
allow the free flow of data.  
The third IA capability, network management, is the linchpin of any network. The 
International Standards Organization Network Management Model outlines the functions 
of configuration, accounting, fault, performance, and security management. Each is 
important to an efficient network, but the most important functions to IA and the defense 
of the network from attack are security and configuration management.  
Security management defends the network by controlling access through 
operating system permissions “so the network cannot be sabotaged (intentionally or 
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unintentionally) and sensitive information cannot be accessed by those without 
appropriate authorization” (CISOC, 2002).  Configuration management is the second 
layer of computer network defense (CND). All network software must be continuously 
updated with the newest security patches or be replaced with newer versions across the 
network. This will make compromising a network through software or operating system 
faults significantly harder. 
The next two capabilities, information security and communications security, deal 
directly the procedures concerning data manipulation, storage, printing, filing and the 
access control procedures required of personnel who have access to data or use the 
network (e.g., passwords). Communications security also focuses on ensuring secure 
communications by using special cryptography equipment and keys, limiting access to 
both.  
The last IA capability is operations security (OPSEC). OPSEC is ensuring 
operational data or plans aren’t conveyed to an adversary. Operational information can 
come from many sources to include monitored phone calls, abnormal activity in 
organizational buildings at odd hours, spouses mentioning members are going out of 
town for a period of time while in the store, or many people buying the same kind of 
supplies from local stores all at once. All are telltale signs that something is going to 
happen. For example, pizza delivery people in Washington DC can usually tell when the 
Department of Defense is planning something because the number of pizzas delivered to 
the Pentagon skyrockets (“And Bomb”, 1990). 
 In general, IA focuses on the technology, but it is dependent on people. It relies 
on the ability of individuals to think about the situation and take the actions necessary to 
maintain information security at different levels. This in turn leads organizations to 
establish standards of behavior and standard operating procedures. 
2. Wetware Standardization 
The key concept of this quadrant is to understand how an organization manages 
its own information and information systems through standard operating procedures. As 
an organization matures and learns to survive in its environment, it establishes standard 
procedures and accepted practices based on experience. This institutional knowledge is 
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passed along to all of the organization’s members through the capabilities listed in Figure 
9.  The conformance mandate starts when a new employee is indoctrinated into the 
organization. He or she is taught how the organization is structured and the “chain of 
command”, how to function in the organization, and respond in organizationally 
appropriate ways to situations. This “programming” of an individual’s wetware is 
intended to standardize how people in the organization function at all levels to maximize 
efficiency.  
Figure 9.   Elements of Wetware (DIO vs. mental processes). 
The standard operating procedures associated with INFOSEC, OPSEC, and 
COMSEC are all anchored in an individual’s thought processes. All security programs 
rely on the mental ability of the individual to understand the policies and always “ do the 
right thing.” They must realize the ramifications of their actions, from discussing 
operational information on an open telephone line to sending people’s social security 
numbers over unclassified email.  
3. Denial/ Disruption/Destruction Operations 
Denial/Disruption/Destruction operations involve attacking an adversary’s 
information infrastructure directly using both kinetic and electronic capabilities. This 
quadrant represents the IO capabilities usually first thought of and most frequently used 
because they are the hard, physical, hands-on capabilities of IO (see Figure 10). Most 
decision makers like the straightforwardness of the denial/disruption/destruction 
capabilities because they represent the “force on force” military model of normal physical 
warfare.  
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Figure 10.   Elements of Denial/Disruption/Destruction Operations (OIO vs. technology). 
Each of the capabilities in this quadrant of our matrix can be used to deny, 
disrupt, or destroy an adversary’s information or information infrastructure. The level of 
attack could only be assigned after a thorough target analysis to determine the level of 
damage to attain the desired information objectives.  For example, a physical attack could 
damage or destroy a communications tower, radio antenna, or a command and control 
bunker. Additionally, the electronic warfare capabilities could use electromagnetic 
energy to interfere with broadcasts and communications or EW could use directed energy 
to destroy enemy information infrastructures or deployed forces.  
Offensive computer network operations (CNO) are broken down into two 
subcategories: computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation 
(CNE). CNA involves breaking or “hacking” into an opponents information system and 
either destroying it or rendering its data unusable. While CNE involves monitoring the 
activity on a system, placing fictitious data in the system to confuse the enemy, or any 
other activity that comes short of destroying the opponent’s system or its data. The goal 
of exploitation is to gain as much information as possible from your adversary or place as 
much fictitious data as possible without them knowing you are doing it.  
The last capability is special information operations (SIO). The only published 
definition or description of an SIO is found in Joint Publication 1-02. It is purposely 
vague and only discusses the reason for a special approval process. It can be reasonably 
assumed that SIO are related to special activities. They are missions 
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conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives that are planned 
and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or 
acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such 
activities but are not intended to influence US political processes, public 
opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the 
collection and production of intelligence or related support functions 
(Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, p. 403) 
4. Perception Management 
The last quadrant in our matrix is perception management. It is comprised of the 
IO capabilities that are used to affect the information an adversary uses to make 
decisions. It wages the “battle of the story” in the court of world opinion (see Fig. 11). JP 
1-02 defines perception management as the 
actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective 
reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to 
influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and 
official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. (p. 332) 
Figure 11.   Elements of Perception Management (OIO vs. mental processes) 
The first capability is public affairs (PA). Its core mission “is to expedite the flow 
of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public 
and internal audience” (JP 3-61, p I-1). Entire theses have been written on the 
relationship between the military and the media. We will accept the relationship as 
described in current joint doctrine. In this study, we are more interested in the 
requirement for the PA, civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOP) 
messages to be coordinated. Message deconfliction is crucial because the PA, CA, and 
PSYOP messages must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three will be 
lost because information overlaps audiences. To prevent overlap, contradiction, or 
Public Affairs (PA)  Deception  
Counter-deception   Electronic Warfare (EW) 
Counter-propaganda   PSYOP 
Counter-intelligence  Special Information Operations 
Counter-PSYOP  
24 
compromise of deception plans, PA needs to be involved early in the operational 
planning process and throughout the operational campaign (JP 3-61, pp. III-12-13).  
The next set of perception management capabilities we will discuss are the family 
of countering operations: counterdeception, counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, and 
counterpsychological. By expanding the Joint Publication 1-02 definition of 
counterdeception, we will define countering operations as “activities to negate, 
neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from foreign perception 
management operations…[but they do] not include the intelligence function of 
identifying foreign perception management operations” (p. 104). They allow a 
commander to offer a different message to counter an adversary’s perception 
management messages. 
 Now we will discuss deception. The U.S. military engages only in military 
deception because current DOD policy forbids the targeting or misleading of the U.S. 
public, the U.S. Congress, or the U.S. news media. The military may “deliberately 
mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, 
and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that 
will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission”(JP 3-58, p. I-4). A critical 
part of the deception planning process is to coordinate the program with the PA officers 
to “reduce the chance that public affairs officers will inadvertently reveal information that 
could undermine ongoing or planned deception operations” (JP 3-58, p. I-4). 
In addition to its deny/disrupt/destroy roles, Electronic warfare (EW) can be used 
subtly to limit the ability of an adversary to collect accurate intelligence, or use the 
electronic spectrum to broadcast or transmit their message. Friendly forces can use 
electronic masking to conceal an operation or present a false situational picture by 
transmitting controlled electromagnetic energy on friendly frequencies while protecting 
friendly transmissions and systems. Electronic masking presents false or ambiguous data 
to adversary SIGINT or electronic surveillance efforts through disguising, distorting, or 
manipulating friendly sensor data (JP 3-51, p. III-5).  
EW also enables other perception management capabilities, especially deception 
and psychological operations. An example of EW supporting PSYOP is the jamming of 
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radio and television broadcast signals so that friendly programming can be transmitted. 
Like all the other perception management capabilities, the effectiveness of EW is 
dependent on deconfliction and coordination.  
5. Understanding The Whole IO Picture 
By compiling the four IO categories into a single matrix (see Fig. 12), the 
integrated nature of IO becomes apparent. The need to consider the whole range of IO 
capabilities and not focus on a single IO category when developing operational plans 
becomes apparent. The matrix provides a powerful analytical tool to guide the 
development of information strategies and plans. It is also possible to use the matrix to 
critically evaluate past or ongoing information operations campaigns, which we will do 
later in this study. 
 
Figure 12.   The Information Operations Matrix. From unpublished notes from a series of 
seminars on “Conflict in the Information Age”, by John Arquilla, March 2001. 
B. IO IN WAR 
Now that we know how and why IO is a sum of its capabilities, we need to 
determine how to actually apply IO in war. It may sound like a simple task, but it’s not 
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levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. We will discuss how IO could be used 
in each level of war, apply a selection of IO capabilities, and describe the potential result.  
1. IO and the Strategic Level of War 
At the strategic level of war, IO may be used to achieve national objectives and 
influence or affect an adversary’s national power elements (political, military, economic, 
or informational), while protecting similar friendly elements. Using IO at this level 
requires a high degree of coordination among all the participating agencies in the U.S. 
Government (USG), allies, and coalition partners to be successful (U.S. Air Force 
Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, p.28). 
Examples of strategic information operations include using public affairs and 
counterpropaganda operations to “create a lack of confidence in an adversary’s military, 
diplomatic, or economic ability to achieve its goals or defeat US goals” (AFDD 2-5, p. 
29) in a crisis or conflict. Another is using computer network exploitation and electronic 
warfare to “incapacitate an adversary’s ability to lead due to lack of communication with 
its forces or understanding of the operating environment” (AFDD 2-5, p.29).  
2. IO and the Operational Level of War.  
Operational-level IO supports campaign and major operation objectives by 
targeting an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities while protecting friendly ones. 
This will limit how much information an adversary can gather and use, and thereby limit 
his situational awareness, ability to effectively command and control his forces, and 
sustain his logistical tail, which should give friendly forces a significant advantage. 
Examples of operational information operations include using electronic warfare, 
computer network attack/exploitation, physical attack to render an adversary’s automated 
command and control systems useless by disrupting the network infrastructure; 
implanting bad or misleading data and “fogging up” his situational picture; or causing the 
sudden loss of critical network nodes and connections to power supplies. Any and all of 
these would reduce the operational tempo of the adversary and his ability to amass forces. 
Another example is psychological and electronic warfare operations using leaflets, 
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radio/television transmissions, psychological bombing (e.g., BLU-82s) to entice 
adversary troops to surrender or desert.  
3. IO and the Tactical Level of War 
Tactical-level IO focuses on denying adversary units the use of their information 
and information systems for command and control, intelligence, and other combat related 
functions. This is accomplished by using as many of the OIO capabilities as possible and 
not just limiting actions to those found in deny/disrupt/destroy quadrant of the matrix.  
Examples of tactical-level IO include using PSYOP speaker teams with linguists 
or leaflet artillery shells to entice the adversary to surrender, and the use of local area 
radio jammers (electronic warfare) to jam the adversary’s transmissions. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we examined information operations capabilities by first 
categorizing them and then looking at each one individually and discussing its potential 
uses. We started by accepting the division of the 17 IO capabilities into two major 
categories, defensive and offensive information operations. But we pointed out that this 
didn’t provide a convenient framework for commanders to evaluate their information 
operations alternatives. We suggested dividing the two major categories again by 
separating the capabilities by their targets, hardware and mental processes. This created 
the four new categories of information assurance, wetware standardization, 
deny/disrupt/destroy operations, and perception management.  
We then reviewed the capabilities within the new categories and presented 
examples of how each could be used. The four new categories were then compiled into a 
matrix that we suggested could be used as an analytical tool for commanders. It could 
match an IO capability (DIO or OIO) to a type of target (hardware or wetware). We 
closed the chapter by looking at how IO could be used in each level of war and some 
examples.  
Next we will develop a methodology for planning information operations and for 















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK. 
 
29 
III. HOW SHOULD IO BE IMPLEMENTED? 
Now that we have a basic understanding of information operations capabilities, 
we must determine how and when to use them. Joint doctrine offers specific methods for 
planning both defensive and offensive information operations capabilities. The Joint 
Publications look at the planning process from the unique point of view of each IO 
capability (e.g., PSYOP, Electronic Warfare). While this approach is very useful for 
operational and tactical IO planning, it may prove insufficient to develop strategic level 
IO plans and policy.  
A strategic level planning method must provide direction to all organizations that 
participate in information operations so the synergy of an integrated IO campaign can be 
achieved across the government. Current doctrine does not provide a planning 
methodology for strategic or national level information operations. The business sector 
may provide an example we can adapt to meet the requirements of planning for 
information operations.   
A. NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION 
All military operational plans require clear national strategic guidance and 
direction to ensure they align with the overarching concepts, doctrine, and goals of the 
national security policy. The United States has a process to ensure this happens. It is 
called the National Strategy Direction system. It starts with the President and his National 
Security Council and ends with a National Military Strategy (NMS) that reflects the 
nation’s economic, diplomatic, military, and informational goals. A short review of how 
national security direction is distilled into national military strategy (NMS) will provide a 
foundation before we develop an IO planning methodology.  
The National Strategy Direction system (see Figure 13) starts at the top of the 
Executive Branch with the President of the United States and his National Security 
Council (NSC). The NSC 
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is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues 
requiring [a] Presidential decision. The NSC…develops policy options, 
considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require 
interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the 
President, and monitors policy implementation…The NSC prepares 
national security guidance that, with Presidential approval, implements 
national security policy. (Joint Publication 1, p. I-2)  
 
Figure 13.   National Strategic Direction. From Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint 
Operations, September 10, 2001, p. I-4. 
Once the National Security Strategy (NSS) and other national policy statements 
have been published, the next step is to develop the National Military Strategy. It “entails 
the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national 
objectives in peace and war [and] provides the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (CJCS) in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant 
Commanders on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces over the next three to five 
years” (Shalikashvili, 1997, p. 3). The two primary documents, the “National Security 
Strategy and NMS, integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and 
military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies 
(means)” (JP 3-0, p. I-4).  
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The final document in the process is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 
It “provides guidance for planning purposes to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs 
of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities” 
(JP 3-0, p. I-4).  Combatant commanders take this information and use it to form their 
theater or functional strategies and plans to conduct military operations, completing the 
linkage process of national strategy to operational and tactical military plans (JP 3-0, p. I-
5). 
One shortfall of the current process is the lack of clear direction for the 
informational aspect of national power.  The current National Security Strategy discusses 
protecting information infrastructures and preventing asymmetrical information 
operations but does not specifically outline an informational strategy. We will address 
this shortfall later. 
B. A BUSINESS MODEL? 
The government has had mixed success in adapting techniques, models, and 
philosophies from business (e.g., Total Quality Management). But past problems 
shouldn’t prevent us from adopting successful business-planning concepts and deriving 
new approaches to planning information operations.  
In many ways information is like a consumer product. A product must be 
formulated, produced, labeled, shipped, stocked, sold, and the sales tracked to determine 
if the product is meeting the market’s demands. Information is very similar. It may be 
possible to leverage the lessons learned in the business world to more efficiently operate 
in the infosphere. Many military applications of information operations are similar to 
commercial fields. For example Public Affairs is similar to the Public Relations and it 
could be argued that PSYOP is like the Marketing Department of a company, at a very 
macro level. Each is concerned with altering your perception of a product, may it be an 
idea or a can of soup. Not all the IO capabilities have business counterparts, but the 
structure of marketing planning is similar to the planning methodologies described in the 
Joint Publications for each of the perception management capabilities.  
The business analogy may not be as extreme as it may seem. The State 
Department hired Charlotte Beers, a marketing expert with 40 years of experience, as the 
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Under Secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs to “refurbish America’s image 
abroad” It was hoped that her marketing expertise would help the United States recast its 
image in the Middle East. Beers recently said, “we’re going to have to communicate the 
intangible assets of the United States—things like our belief system and our values.” She 
then compared the image of the United States to a brand image in which the goal is to 
“build a relationship between the product and its user” (Starr, 2001, pp. 56-58).  
To build a brand, a company or in this case the nation must market its product to 
the world. To do this we will look at a marking planning methodology that should 
highlight some areas to be considered in IO planning. Roman Hiebing and Scott Cooper 
offer at ten-step marketing planning process (see Table 2), which they claim, will enable 
the user to “define issues, answer questions correctly, and make decisions”(1996, p. 
xxvi). They go on to discuss the merits of their approach and some of their comments 
have applicability to IO planning as well. Here are some excerpts worth noting (Heibing 
& Cooper, 1996, p. xxviii): 
• One needs a well-defined methodology to sort out and interface these 
many overlapping elements 
• Disciplined…planning employs a sequential, step by step system that asks 
for consideration of all tools and takes the marketing through a clear 
incremental building process 
• The sequence of how the plan is ordered is important because what comes 
after in the order of the plan is, in effect, making what comes before 
possible 
• The evaluation step…closes the loop on this continuous and 
comprehensive planning process.  
If you look closely at the descriptions of each step of Heibing and Cooper’s 
approach and disregard the specific business references, it is readily apparent how each 








Table 2.   The ten steps to disciplined marketing planning. From The Successful 
Marketing Plan, Hiebing and Cooper, 1996, pp. xxviii-xxxii. 
 Title Description 
Step One Business Review Situation analysis of market 
Step Two Problems/Opportunities Summary of challenges of market 
Step Three Sales Objectives Projected levels of goods to be sold 
Step Four Target Markets and Marketing Objectives Define target group/target behavior 
desired 
Step Five Plan Strategies Positioning strategy for the image of 
your product and strategies to fulfill 
objectives 
Step Six Communication Goals Set target market awareness and 
attitudes to deliver positioning and 
fulfill marketing objectives 
Step Seven Tactical Marketing Mix Tools Marketing executions to fulfill 
objectives and plans above. Each tool 
should have its own objectives, 
strategies, and executional specifics 
Step Eight Marketing Plan Budget & Calendar, 
Payback analysis 
Cost, timeline, and anticipated net 
receipts of marketing plan 
Step Nine Execution Execute the plan, hope the target market 
buys product 
Step Ten Evaluation Determines level of success in 
marketplace and relates changes needed 
to next iteration of marketing plan. 
 
C. IO PLANNING PROCESS 
Heibing and Cooper’s method provides a deliberative planning template for the 
new information operations planning methodology we will use (see Table 3). It ensures 
that a decision maker develops a comprehensive IO plan that supports national strategy.  
It is also broad enough to address the entire range of information operations. But, to fully 
understand how to use this new approach, we will discuss each new step individually. 
1. Review Strategic Environment 
This is the most critical step in our process because it is where the U.S. evaluates 
the situation, determines where it sits in the world order, where it wants to be in that 
order, and how can the situation be changed if need be. This process truly builds the IO 
foundation for future operations. 
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Table 3.   An IO planning methodology. 
 Title Description 
Step One Review Strategic Environment Situation analysis guided by national 
strategy 
Step Two Identify Problems/Opportunities Summary of challenges/opportunities to 
overcome/exploit 
Step Three Establish Informational Objectives What an informational campaign should 
achieve 
Step Four Target Technology or Audiences Define target group/target behavior 
desired 
Step Five Develop Theme or Message Positioning strategy for to match the 
theme or message to the target audience 
Step Six Establish IO Goals Set target market awareness and 
attitudes to deliver positioning and 
fulfill marketing objectives 
Step Seven Chose IO Capabilities Mix IO executions to fulfill objectives and 
plans above. Each capability should 
have its own objectives, strategies, and 
executional specifics 
Step Eight Complete Risk/Benefit Assessment Review relative cost, time, and risk 
compared to net results of IO plan  
Step Nine Execute and Monitor IO Execute the plan, hope the target 
technology or audience is affected. 
Gather data during execution for 
evaluation. 
Step Ten Evaluate and Modify Determines level of success and apply 
needed changes to IO plan 
 
2. Identify Problems/Opportunities 
This step takes the results from the review and tries to identify any problems with 
the messages or ideas the United States wants out in the infosphere. We can also identify 
any opportunities where we can exploit a situation to provide a counter message or 
correction to erroneous information about the United States in the infosphere.   
3. Establish IO Objectives 
Armed with potential problem areas and opportunities, it is possible to develop a 
plan and derive objectives to attain using information operations. Information operations 
objectives should be broad enough at the strategic level to grant wide latitude in meeting 
them. But they should also be descriptive enough to ensure the proper actions are taken to 
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meet the national strategic goals. The IO objectives are will drive the rest of the planning 
process and will be the criteria to evaluate the missions once complete.  
4. Target Technology or Audience 
The next step is to take the objectives and determine who or what should be 
targeted for the particular information operation. In many cases, both technology and 
wetware will be targeted to affect both the adversary’s ability to use his equipment and to 
make knowledgeable decisions. This step requires detailed intelligence on the potential 
targets to be successful.  
An important point to make here is not to forget to look at all the technologies and 
audiences that are “connected” to your target or in your ability to launch an IO. Collateral 
damage to alliances, international relationships, friendly information infrastructure, 
coalition forces, public support at home, and international perceptions can negate the 
results of an otherwise successful IO. 
5. Develop Theme or Message 
This step may involve two subprocesses. For the technology targets, a theme may 
provide a touchstone or motivating idea for those supporting the IO, like “Remember 
9/11.” If the target is an audience, a message and/or a theme will have to be created that 
will entice the target audience to modify their behavior or concept of the issue in line 
with the IO objectives.  It is important to consider the “message content, tone, 
communication vehicle, and frequency” (Heibing & Cooper, 1996, p. 380) when 
targeting internal and external audiences.  
6. Establish coordinated IO Goals  
The next step is to use the foundation of information built in the previous steps 
and align the entire operation with the other elements of national power by establishing 
goals for the IO. This will allow the IO to support the objectives of the other elements 
and vice versa. Unlike objectives, which are prescriptive, these goals should be 
descriptive of the actions needed to affect the target’s behavior (Heibing & Cooper, 1996, 
p. 204). In this step we use these goals to divide the task at hand so the appropriate IO 
capabilities can be assigned to each subtask. This is a complex process because the 
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environment is constantly changing, and what was once a valid IO goal could easily be 
overcome by events.  
7. Choose IO Capabilities Mix 
With a set of IO goals, the next step is to assign those IO capabilities most 
applicable to accomplishing each goal. This can be a straightforward process, but it can 
also involve assigning IO capabilities in an oblique manner to achieve an IO goal. 
Creativity and imagination is often the key to IO success. Remember the Chinese use of a 
simple computer-generated MPEG file of the fighter and EP-3 mentioned in Chapter 1. It 
is easy to imagine their IO goal was to tilt world opinion in their favor. They achieved 
this to a degree by blending Public Affairs, PSYOP, and deception. 
An important concept to consider while formulating the IO capability mix is that 
the IO capabilities, especially the perception management capabilities, are not “off or on” 
capabilities. They can be targeted to specific subaudiences and used in degrees of 
aggressiveness.  
8. Complete Risk/Benefit Assessment 
The last step before execution is to complete an objective assessment of the cost, 
time and risks versus the end benefit of the plan as it currently stands. Objectivity is the 
key here. No plan is going to be perfect, but a good plan should be free of critical defects. 
If critical problems or shortfalls are identified, then return to the step that addresses the 
problem area and restart the planning process from there. If the plan has no critical 
shortfalls and the risks in cost and time are acceptable, then the next step is to execute the 
plan. 
9. Execute and Monitor IO 
Good execution is the key to success of any plan, especially IO. The IO plan is 
greater than the sum of its elements, as the effect of each element is enhanced by the 
impact of the other elements. Attention to detail “assure[s] that the synergistic effect of 
all the…[IO] plan activities will take place” (Heibing & Cooper, 1996, p. 374).  
As the plan is executed, it should be monitored for compliance with the IO 
objectives and goals. Any deviations in execution or result should be noted and used to 
evaluate the plan. 
37 
10. Evaluate and Modify 
Finally, all efforts require continuous monitoring to gauge the effectiveness of the 
IO campaign. The IO objectives and goals are the scorecard for the campaign. This 
evaluation process is not limited to an after action analysis, it should be ongoing during 
the execution of an IO campaign so that timely changes can be made within the dynamic 
environment of the infosphere and realpolitik.  
D. DELIBERATE AND CRISIS IO PLANNING 
Information flows around the world all the time and the United States must be 
prepared to respond in an instant. The continual evolution and revolution in information 
technology is collapsing the infosphere to a point where almost everyone will only have 
one degree of separation from everyone else. This near point-to-point connectivity will 
dictate rapid informational responses to world events.  
There will still be a need to do deliberative IO planning in support of theater 
operational and tactical operations. But these plans will have to be reviewed more 
frequently to keep up with emerging technology and the ever-changing situation in the 
infosphere. The planning method presented would be especially useful in a crisis because 
it logically guides the planner through all the required areas so nothing is overlooked 
during the heat of the battle. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we looked at how National Strategic Direction currently guides the 
development of the National Military Strategy. And we found the current Joint doctrine 
to be focused only on the operational and tactical level of IO, so a new strategic IO 
planning methodology is needed to assist decision makers. The business world offers 
some ready templates for organizational approaches to strategic thinking. One is the 
concept of a marketing plan.  
We took the basic marketing plan and modified the ten steps to provide a linear 
process to ensure all the aspects of IO are addressed during the planning process. After 
discussing each step, we concluded the chapter with a discussion of how the near point-
to-point connectivity in the infosphere makes planning for IO a continuous activity. 
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Next we will use the IO planning methodology to evaluate the U.S. response to 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and during the first few months of the war on 
terrorism. 
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IV. IO IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 
The American government’s reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 provides a timely glimpse into how the government plans and executes the 
informational aspects of national power during a time of crisis. Through the chaos created 
by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Administration had to 
respond quickly to the situation by providing the nation with information and direction. 
This analysis will use the IO planning methodology developed in the previous chapter to 
evaluate the informational response of the United States to terrorist attacks. 
Many of the details of exactly what the Administration did during the period 
immediately after the attacks have not been made public. It is reasonable to assume the 
Administration followed a logical crisis response process similar to our IO planning 
methodology. We will compare what information is available on the events shortly after 
the attacks to the IO planning methodology.  
Immediately after the second plane hit the World Trade Center and the third plane 
hit the Pentagon, the President and his advisors took actions that fit the logic of steps one 
through four of the IO planning method. First, they analyzed the strategic environment 
and decided to put the government on a high state of alert in case of additional attacks. 
After things calmed down a little and the initial shock of the attacks wore off, they 
overcame the challenges and found opportunities to get their messages out. The 
Administration seemed to have the clear informational goals of: reassuring the country 
that the government was still in place; all efforts were being made to help those affected; 
and “the United States [would] hunt down and punish those responsible for these 
cowardly acts” (Bush, 2001). Additionally, they wanted to reassure the Muslim 
community that Islam was not under attack by the United States; and any country 
suspected of supporting terrorism should understand that the U.S. would respond 
militarily if the supporters didn’t change their allegiance.  
The Administration tried to relay their message to specific audiences by 
specifically addressing them in press conferences and speeches. The Administration 
attempted to send clear signals to the terrorists and the countries supporting them that the 
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U.S. would bring them to justice. And the Administration also tried to reassure our allies, 
the Muslim world, and the American people that the terrorists not Muslims were the 
targets of America’s interest and that the U.S. would not rest until the perpetrators were 
apprehended. This played into the Administration’s developing theme of  “justified 
retaliation” (“Bush gets”, 2001, ¶ 2). America had been attacked and almost every other 
country quickly supported the right under international law of the United States to take 
unilateral retaliatory action against those organizations or states responsible. 
With the elements of the first six steps of our IO planning methodology complete, 
next was to determine the mix of IO capabilities to employ. The selection requires careful 
thought based on the IO objectives, themes, and goals described above. According to 
published reports, the U.S. has focused on the offensive information operations (OIO) 
capabilities of physical attack, electronic warfare, limited psychological operations, 
computer network exploitation, and computer network attack. Combat operations against 
the Taliban radio stations and the Al Jazeera television station would support both 
physical attack and electronic warfare goals to limit the ability of al Qaeda to get its 
message out (McCaleb, 2001, ¶ 4).  Psychological operations have been limited to leaflet 
drops and aerial radio broadcast providing information about humanitarian assistance and 
“messages encouraging enemy troops to surrender and give up the fight” (Williams, 
2001, ¶ 7). And finally, the recent round up of al Qaeda operatives around the world 
indicates their networked organization has been compromised potentially through 
computer network analysis and exploitation capabilities by using traffic analysis 
programs that trace the routes emails take thru the Internet; and “sniffer” programs that 
look for certain word combinations within emails (Salkever, 2002, ¶ 3).  
If these are the only OIO capabilities used, then the U.S. failed to take full 
advantage of the capabilities of deception, counterpropaganda, public affairs, civil affairs, 
counterintelligence, and special information operations. No evidence could be found in 
unclassified sources that suggested there was national level information direction or 
centralized information policy to follow in preparing the operations. This became 
apparent with the early stumbles over the name of the operation, “INFINITE JUSTICE”, 
and the whole debacle over “crusading.” 
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A working group on Special Information Operations, four graduate students, 
including the author of this thesis, developed an analysis tool to examine how all IO 
capabilities might be applied to all audiences. The group then spent many hours 
discussing the nuances of the relationships and potential applicability of each IO 
capability to each audience. The following is the author’s summary of those discussions 
and conclusions. 
A. IO CAPABILITIES MIX ANALYSIS  
This analysis examines only the offensive information operations capabilities with 
the exception of physical attack and special information operations. Both of these are 
always options but have potential military repercussions. It will be assumed that all of the 
DIO capabilities were activated at all levels within the U.S. because of the increased 
information condition (INFOCON) levels right after the terrorist attacks. The level of 
vigilance to DIO was demonstrated when most all government web sites were shut down 
immediately after the attack. 
The analysis relies on the list of target audiences and technologies, then a 
subjective assessment of the applicability of each IO capability to and relative effect on 
each target audience or technology is made. A capability is “applicable” when it affects 
the target audience or the enabling technology in a measurable way. If applicable, then an 
estimate of its effectiveness is made using the following grading scale: great effect, some 
effect, little effect, and no effect. Definitions of each of the ratings are provided in Table 
4. The results of the analysis are compiled into a single matrix for each intended 
audience. We have defined the intended audiences of the war on terrorism as: the 
terrorists (al Qaeda), the Taliban, the Afghan population, other Islamic states, the non-
allied world, the U.S. allies in the war on terrorism, and the U.S. population.  
It is worth noting that in some instances, an extremely fine line was drawn 
between the ratings. When in doubt, a conservative position was adopted rather than 
chance overestimating the effectiveness of a capability. Also, each assessment was 
reevaluated to ensure no “mirror imaging” took place that might taint the objectivity of 
the analysis.  
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Table 4.   Applicability ratings. 
*** Great Effect 
The tool could eliminate, or fully disrupt (no workarounds 
possible) the target audience’s ability to transmit their 
message or use their technology. 
 ** Some Effect 
The tool could partially disrupt (workarounds possible), or 
severely degrade the target audience’s ability to transmit 
their message. 
  * Little Effect 
The tool could minimally disrupt (nuisance) and minimally 
degrade the target audience’s ability to transmit their 
message. 
  - No Effect 
Either the tool had no effect or wasn’t applicable to the 
target audience due to convention, law, or current 
technological ability. 
 
This matrix approach can be used to look at the IO strategy problem from many 
different perspectives. While this demonstrates the strength of the matrix method, it can 
also cause confusion. This analysis focuses only on the applicability and potential 
effectiveness of the information operations capabilities. A short explanation will be 
provided for the effectiveness rating assigned to each IO capability for each audience. 
And then the individual matrices will be compiled into a single color-coded matrix for a 
final strategic analysis. An example of the color-coded composite matrix is shown in  



























































































1. Al Qaeda Terrorists 
The group is “a coalition of disparate radical Islamic groups of varying 
nationalities…work[ing] toward common goals – the expulsion of non-Muslim control or 
influence from Muslim-inhabited lands” (Katzman, 2001, p. 9). Al Qaeda abhors Western 
influences but happily “rides the rails” of the modern information infrastructure to 
achieve its extremist goals. Usama bin Laden has been reported using satellite telephones, 
cellular telephones, computer networks as well as personal messengers to guide the 
worldwide coalition of terrorist organizations (Sieberg, 2001, p. 1). This unique mix of 
high and low tech will present a challenge to any IO effort waged against him. Below is 
an estimate of the effectiveness of the IO capabilities and tools against the al Qaeda 
terrorists. A summary of the analysis is presented in Figure 15. 
• Public Affairs: U.S. efforts to present accurate information would have 
little effect on terrorists directly. 
• Counter-Propaganda: U.S. counter-propaganda efforts would have little 
effect on hard-core terrorists who are heavily indoctrinated with their 
organizations’ beliefs. 
• Civil Affairs: Traditional CA missions would not be applicable directly to 
the terrorists. 
• Counter-Intelligence:  Successful CI efforts would have a great effect. 
Denying them the ability to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism would 
deprive them of their main method to gain visibility. 
• PSYOP: PSYOP could have great effect on the morale and mental 
attitudes of terrorists. 
• Deception: Deception could have great effect if carried out in a way to 
inhibit the terrorist’s ability to move and act. 
• Computer Network Exploitation: CNE could provide some stunning 
information on the operations of terrorist organizations as long as they rely 
on computers or larger international networks (like the worldwide web) to 
move information. The assessment of great effect is predicated on this 
dependence on larger computer networks to clandestinely move 
information. 
• Computer Network Attack:  CNA is rated as having little effect because 
most terrorist organizations wouldn’t risk setting up a standing network in 
a building or office. It is much easier to use ubiquitous internet cafes and 
other organizational sites to transmit information to the terrorist 
organization. 
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• Electronic Warfare: EW could be of great effectiveness if it is determined 
what types of communication gear the organization is using and 
determining how to exploit or deny its use. 
Figure 15.   Applicability of IO against terrorists. 
2. The Taliban 
 Although defeated as of the date of this analysis, this group represented a 
state sponsor of terrorism and is a good example of a less technically-oriented society that 
represents a significant number of third world countries. If anything, the Taliban 
represents an extreme case because they openly pursued a campaign to purge society of 
almost all advanced technology.  
Since the time they gained control over most of Afghanistan territory in 1996, the 
Taliban pursued an isolationist and fundamentalist Islamic agenda. Their movement 
represented an ideological mixture of rural Pashtun values, Islamic fundamentalism and 
totalitarian thinking. Their goal was to establish the world's ‘purest’ Islamic state, 
banning what they perceived as corrupting agents and frivolities like television, music 
and cinema. (“Taliban”, 2001) 
Because of their disdain for technology and modern technology, an effective IO 
campaign will be difficult using modern means, but not impossible. The estimate of the 
applicability of the various IO capabilities against the Taliban follows, and a summary is 
presented in Figure 16. 
Al Qaeda Terrorists
Public Affairs (PA)  *
Counterpropaganda (CP)  *
Civil Affairs (CA)  -
Counterintelligence (CI) ***
Psychological Ops (PSYOP) ***
Deception ***
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) ***
Computer Network Attack (CNA)  *
Electronic Warfare (EW) ***
-  No Effect    * Little Effect    ** Some Effect    *** Great Effect 
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• Public Affairs: U.S. efforts to present accurate information would have 
little effect on the Taliban government itself because they firmly believe in 
their cause. 
• Counter-Propaganda: U.S. counter-propaganda efforts could have great 
effect on the Taliban’s ability to garner support or positive world opinion 
because the U.S. could come out and refute every allegation. This could 
cause the Taliban government embarrassment and loss of any prestige it 
has in the world. 
• Civil Affairs: Traditional CA missions would not be applicable directly to 
the Taliban themselves. Even CA actions taken in Pashtun areas of 
Afghanistan would not affect the position of the government. 
• Counter-Intelligence:  CI would have little effect on the Taliban because 
they are isolated and are focused on themselves with little regard for world 
opinion. 
• PSYOP: PSYOP could have great effect on the morale and mental 
attitudes of the Taliban if they could be convinced their objectives are 
unattainable. The challenge will be getting the message to them. 
• Deception: Deception could have great effect if carried out in a way to 
reduce the Taliban’s ability to move and act. 
• Computer Network Exploitation: CNE would have little effect on the 
Taliban government. Their abandonment of technology isolates them from 
this IO tool. 
• Computer Network Attack:  CNA would have little effect on the Taliban 
government. Their abandonment of technology isolates them from this IO 
tool. 
• Electronic Warfare: If the information and communications infrastructure 
of the Taliban were known, EW could be very effective to exploit or deny 
its use. 
3. The Afghan Population 
Afghanistan is a country of 26 million people who live in abject poverty under a 
severe interpretation of Islamic law where the average life expectancy for a man is 46 
years and only 45 for women (“Afghanistan: Country Profile”, 2001).  Twenty-one years 
of civil war have forced over 500,000 Afghanis into refugee camps in neighboring 
countries (“Afghanistan”, 2001). And six years of Taliban rule has eliminated most of the 
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Figure 16.   Applicability of IO against the Taliban. 
information infrastructure in Afghanistan. In 1999 there were only an estimated10 
television stations serving only 100,000 television sets, and a single radio station in 
Kabul serving 167,000 radios (“Afghanistan”, 2001). This dispersal of the Afghan people 
and the elimination of the county’s infrastructure will present an extreme challenge to the 
traditional U.S. use of information operations. It has been widely reported that the general 
population of Afghanistan is anti-Taliban and there is a desire for a new form of 
government. This positive environment should enhance the applicability of certain IO 
capabilities.  Below is an assessment of the applicability of IO capabilities and tools 
towards the Afghan people. A summary is presented in Figure 17. 
• Public Affairs: U.S. efforts to present accurate information would have 
little effect on the people of Afghanistan directly because their lives are 
not affected by current world events. Some would listen to objective news 
broadcasts to monitor the conflict with the Taliban via radio.  
• Counter-Propaganda: U.S. counter-propaganda efforts would have little 
effect on the average Afghani. Although clear news and a counterpoint to 
the Taliban’s message could build good will, the lack of radios and 
television will prevent most Afghanis from hearing any U.S. message. 
• Civil Affairs: Traditional CA missions would be greatly applicable 
directly to people of Afghanistan because the country has no infrastructure 
left after twenty-one years of war. Roads, sewers, water, schools, training 
the local police, etc. would build good will towards the U.S. and 
eventually the new government of Afghanistan.  
Taliban
Public Affairs (PA)  *
Counterpropaganda (CP) ***
Civil Affairs (CA)  -
Counterintelligence (CI) **
Psychological Ops (PSYOP) **
Deception ***
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)  *
Computer Network Attack (CNA)  *
Electronic Warfare (EW) ***
-  No Effect    * Little Effect    ** Some Effect    *** Great Effect 
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• Counter-Intelligence:  CI would have little effect on the Afghani 
population because they currently support the Northern Alliance and the 
United States’ actions against the Taliban and al Qaeda.  
• PSYOP: Traditional PSYOP methods (leaflets, loudspeakers) are some of 
the best ways to broadcast information in general. An effective campaign 
could be waged that would entice the Afghanis to support and help the 
U.S. This would have minimal impact unless cartoon leaflets or small 
radios were provided because most people can’t read and don’t have 
radios.  
• Deception: Deception would have little effect on the Afghani population 
of 26 million. This is based on the assumption of that limited 
communications would prevent a single story being presented across the 
country, so a regional or tribal approach would have to be devised. This 
adds complexity and time to complete a successful deception.   
• Computer Network Exploitation: CNE would have little effect on the 
Afghani people because they have little to no computer infrastructure. 
• Computer Network Attack:  CNA would have little effect on the Afghani 
people because they have little to no computer infrastructure. 
• Electronic Warfare: If EW was targeted only at the Taliban 
communication methods but avoided other systems, then the Afghanis 
could reestablish communication systems (telephone, radio) within their 
country.    
Figure 17.   Applicability of IO directed toward the Afghan population. 
Afghan Population
Public Affairs (PA)  *
Counterpropaganda (CP)  *
Civil Affairs (CA) ***
Counterintelligence (CI)  *
Psychological Ops (PSYOP)  *
Deception  *
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)  -
Computer Network Attack (CNA)  -
Electronic Warfare (EW) **
-  No Effect    * Little Effect    ** Some Effect    *** Great Effect 
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4. Other Islamic States 
It is important to look beyond racial considerations and identify how the message 
presented by the U.S. could affect all nations with large Muslim populations, not only the 
Arab nations. This focus on populations within other nations highlights the dynamics 
affecting the U.S-led anti-terrorism coalition formed after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. The coalition is like any other diplomatic arrangement; it depends 
on the perceived benefits to its participants. This dynamic requires the U.S. to carefully 
examine every action it takes, including IO. The potential applicability of the IO tools is 
described below and summarized in Figure 18. 
• Public Affairs: A robust PA effort would be the most applicable of the IO 
tools. A constant flow of accurate and timely information to the world 
could ensure greater acceptance of unilateral U.S. military actions by the 
anti-terrorism coalition member states, especially the Islamic ones. 
• Counter-Propaganda: This would have limited applicability because a 
strong PA function would thwart any propaganda campaign by a terrorist 
organization. 
• Civil Affairs: CA actions would have little applicability because they 
wouldn’t affect the way Islamic countries responded to American actions. 
The U.S. could use CA actions to strengthen its relationship to that 
country, but this would be no guarantee of support in the war on terrorism. 
• Counter-Intelligence:  CI would have little applicability against other 
Islamic countries unless the countries were involved in collecting 
intelligence on U.S. interests.  
• PSYOP: PSYOP could have some effect if creative campaigns were 
designed to convince both the government leaders of the Islamic countries 
and the people of the Islamic world of the true goals of the U.S. war 
against terrorism. This dual focus is required to encourage a common 
perception of U.S. actions at both the governmental and individual levels. 
• Deception: A deception campaign could be a short-term success; but if the 
deception were compromised, the Islamic world would no longer trust the 
U.S. at its word. Because of the high risk to the long-term relationships, it 
is our assessment that the U.S. should not start a deception campaign. 
•  Computer Network Exploitation: CNE would have little applicability on 
friendly Islamic countries. Exploitation could be done if known terrorists 
were using the Islamic country’s networks and the country didn’t have the 
capability to exploit the data themselves.  
• Computer Network Attack:  CNA would have little applicability on 
friendly Islamic countries. A CNA could be carried out through an Islamic 
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county’s networks if known terrorists were using them and the country 
didn’t have the capability to attack the terrorist’s networks themselves or 
if political sensitivities within that country preclude it from sharing the 
information. This would likely be a high-risk situation (based on blowback 
if U.S. action was revealed) and would require a high gain to offset this 
risk. 
• Electronic Warfare: EW would not be applicable against Islamic countries 
supporting the anti-terrorism coalition actions. 
Figure 18.   Applicability of IO directed toward other Islamic states. 
5. Non-Aligned Countries 
There are only a few countries that haven’t committed themselves to the 
principles of the anti-terrorism coalition led by the U.S.  Most countries had or have 
recently committed to the various United Nations treaties on counter-terrorism and have 
agreed to take the internationally sanctioned anti-terrorism actions, but the U.S. must 
consider the unintended consequences of its IO campaign to the rest of the world. A 
summary of the assessments is found in Figure 19. 
• Public Affairs: Just like other Islamic states, a robust PA effort would be a 
highly applicable IO tool. A constant flow of accurate and timely 
information to the world could ensure greater acceptance of unilateral U.S. 
and/or allied military actions. 
• Counter-Propaganda: Counter-propaganda would allow the U.S. to refute 
various allegations and limit any perceptions on impropriety made by a 
non-allied country. 
Other Islamic States
Public Affairs (PA) ***
Counterpropaganda (CP)  *
Civil Affairs (CA)  *
Counterintelligence (CI)  *
Psychological Ops (PSYOP) **
Deception  -
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)  *
Computer Network Attack (CNA)  *
Electronic Warfare (EW)  -
-  No Effect    * Little Effect    ** Some Effect    *** Great Effect 
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• Civil Affairs: CA would have no applicability because countries have to 
be on good terms with the U.S. to receive support through a CA program. 
• Counter-Intelligence:  CI would definitely be applicable. The U.S. would 
have to step up its CI activities to ensure non-allied countries don’t 
become havens for terrorists or their organizations. 
• PSYOP: PSYOP could have some effect if a program was developed to 
convince the population and governments to join the coalition.  
• Deception: A deception campaign would have little effect on a non-allied 
country because these countries are already resistant to U.S. actions. There 
could be some deceptions that would motivate a state to join the anti-
terrorism coalition, but there is a medium level of risk it could backfire 
and cost the U.S. some prestige/influence.  
• Computer Network Exploitation: Exploitation would be of little overall 
effect unless the U.S. could find some information that the non-allied 
countries are supporting the terrorists or their organizations. Once again 
there is some risk of blowback if the exploitation actions were discovered. 
• Computer Network Attack:  CNA would not be applicable unless the 
country becomes a terrorist supporting entity.  
• Electronic Warfare: EW would not be applicable unless the country 
becomes a terrorist supporting entity. 
Figure 19.   Applicability of IO direct toward non-allied countries. 
Non-Aligned World
Public Affairs (PA) ***
Counterpropaganda (CP) ***
Civil Affairs (CA)  -
Counterintelligence (CI) ***
Psychological Ops (PSYOP) **
Deception  *
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)  *
Computer Network Attack (CNA)  -
Electronic Warfare (EW)  -
-  No Effect    * Little Effect    ** Some Effect    *** Great Effect 
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6. U.S. Allies in the war on terrorism 
With few exceptions, the world has united against terrorism. The level of support 
to the U.S. led coalition against terrorism is an historic first. The coalition is made up of 
countries with varied political ideologies and motivations that all need to be addressed. 
The U.S. has to be especially careful in implementing any IO capabilities and tools that 
might offend or alienate a coalition partner. There is a difference in the strategic 
relationship between the U.S. and its traditional allies, like Britain, and the relationships 
between the U.S. and the other anti-terrorism coalition partners. The long-term allies 
could be less offended by what would be perceived as offensive or deceptive information 
operations. Coalition partners most likely would terminate their participation and be more 
reluctant to join coalitions in the future. The assessments were made based on a middle 
ground expected reaction. A summary of the assessments is presented in Figure 20. 
• Public Affairs: The ability of the U.S. to provide accurate and timely 
information to all of its allies would greatly enhance the cohesion of the 
anti-terrorism coalition. 
• Counter-Propaganda: A U.S. counterpropaganda effort would guarantee 
that the allies received accurate information to act upon and not just 
unconfirmed reports from terrorists or their supporting countries.   
• Civil Affairs: Direct CA actions in allied countries would have no effect 
on the battle against terrorism. 
• Counter-Intelligence:  The U.S. should limit its CI efforts and use it to 
monitor the situation in allied countries to prevent any type of espionage 
or sabotage. 
• PSYOP: PSYOP would be somewhat applicable on allied countries. The 
U.S. could selectively release information to allied countries to ensure 
their continued support of the coalition. This is a high-risk policy decision 
that could have considerable blowback and damage strategic relationships 
quite easily.  
• Deception: Outright deception of allies wouldn’t be applicable. This may 
sound hypocritical after the assessment for PSYOP, but there is a subtle 
difference between the two. It comes down to just prolonging allies’ 
access to all of the information as opposed to outright deceiving them. 
•  Computer Network Exploitation: CNE is not applicable for use against 
allied countries. 
• Computer Network Attack:  CNA is not applicable for use against allied 
countries. 
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• Electronic Warfare: EW is not applicable for use against allied countries. 
Figure 20.   Applicability of IO directed toward allies.  
7. U.S. Public 
An information operations campaign in the United States should be based on 
giving the American public timely and accurate information. Decision makers must 
consider the national and military security ramifications of releasing information to the 
world. There may be instances when it is inappropriate to release certain information 
about government or military operations to protect the participants. This should be the 
exception rather than the rule.  A continuing debate rages between operational security 
requirements and the media’s belief in the “right “ to know. This analysis took the middle 
ground of the issues involved. A summary of the assessments is presented in Figure 21. 
• Public Affairs: PA is the best IO tool to use “against” the American 
public. Presenting them with accurate and timely information should 
continue to garner their support for U.S. actions. 
• Counter-Propaganda: Counter-propaganda is directly applicable to 
keeping accurate information in front of the American public to ensure 
their continued support. 
• Civil Affairs: Although National Guard disaster recovery acts could be 
argued as CA activities to the American population, CA right now 
supporting U.S. citizens would have no effect on the war on terrorism. 
• Counter-Intelligence:  CI would have some effect to ensure other nations 
or groups aren’t planning to attack more U.S. targets. This type of activity 
Allies
Public Affairs (PA) ***
Counterpropaganda (CP) ***
Civil Affairs (CA)  -
Counterintelligence (CI)  *
Psychological Ops (PSYOP) **
Deception  -
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)  -
Computer Network Attack (CNA)  -
Electronic Warfare (EW)  -
-  No Effect    * Little Effect    ** Some Effect    *** Great Effect 
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would be handled by the FBI and would involve some invasive policing 
actions that require Federal level approval. 
• PSYOP: PSYOP against Americans is prohibited. 
• Deception: Deception of the American public is not recommended. 
Eventually someone will find out and there will be a significant political 
blowback. Consider the media’s reactions after the “left hook” in 
DESERT STORM when it was revealed that the Marine assault was a 
deception.  
• Computer Network Exploitation: CNE would cause a similar political 
outrage about individual civil rights and isn’t recommended. But the FBI 
is currently doing some CNE on email servers with a program called 
Carnivore but only after receiving court orders approving the actions 
(Johnson, 2001). 
• Computer Network Attack:  CNA is not advised against the U.S. 
population in general. 
• Electronic Warfare: EW should not be an option against the U.S. 
population in general. It would take extraordinary circumstances for EW 
to occur within the U.S.  
Figure 21.   Applicability of IO directed toward U.S. population. 
 
8. IO Mix Conclusion 
When the individual category assessments are compiled into a single color matrix, 
an interesting pattern appears (see Figure 22). First, it becomes apparent that the current 
U.S. emphasis on CNE, CNA, and EW, is shortsighted and doesn’t consider the effects 
U.S. Public
Public Affairs (PA) ***
Counterpropaganda (CP) ***
Civil Affairs (CA)  -
Counterintelligence (CI) **
Psychological Ops (PSYOP)  -
Deception  -
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)  -
Computer Network Attack (CNA)  -
Electronic Warfare (EW)  -
-  No Effect    * Little Effect    ** Some Effect    *** Great Effect 
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the other six OIO tools could have on an opponent. The U.S. isn’t benefiting from the 
synergy a coherent information strategy could provide. Secondly, and quite surprisingly, 
the composite matrix vividly shows that the current U.S. strategy based on CNO and EW 
ignores or minimizes over two thirds of the world audience.  
Figure 22.   Composite analysis matrix. 
B. EXECUTION AND EVALUATION 
The last two steps of the IO planning methodology are the execution of the plan 
and monitoring its progress and the evaluation of the execution to make the required 
changes in the next iteration of the IO plan.  The Administration did these two steps fairly 
well. They were careful to monitor how information played on the world stage and 
modified their approach based on the feedback from the original message. The consistent 
reassurance of the worldwide Muslim community was a perfect example. The 
Administration adjusted the message and method many times based on feedback from 













































































































The ten step sequence in our IO planning methodology seems to capture the 
essential decisions to be made when crafting a policy and a plan for the informational 
aspect of national power. The Bush Administration’s actions in response to the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 resemble the logic of the IO planning methodology 
presented in this chapter. But the emphasis on CNA, CNE, EW, and poorly executed 
perception management was self-limiting. The analysis suggests that the U.S. could have 
initially been much more effective in the infosphere if it had focused its message and 
used all the IO capabilities at its disposal.  
It is worth mentioning that the Administration realized the shortfall in its ability to 
project our message to the rest of the word and decided to create the Office of Strategic 
Information within the Department of Defense. The office was to “set up policies for 
information operations and warfare that will then be carried out by military specialists to 
‘influence the hearts and minds of the opposition’” (“New Pentagon Office”, 2002).  The 
biggest problem initially identified would  “be coordinating with the Pentagon's public 
affairs operation, the State Department's overseas diplomacy program and the White 
House's ‘war room’ (“New Pentagon Office”, 2002). But the office died a political death 
within four days of its announcement when the press widely reported that the main 
purpose of the office was to intentionally mislead foreign media. Secretary Rumsfeld 
realized that the office would not survive all the bad press and be effective, so decided to 
close it. He did say that information operations and strategic influence operations would 
continue, “just in different offices” (“Pentagon closes”, 2002). 
The next chapter will suggest a possible solution to ensure all of the information 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SYNOPSIS 
In this thesis we have explored the idea that a national information strategy would 
enhance the effectiveness and breadth of military operations, specifically military 
information operations. We started with a discussion of the importance of information 
and how easily it is moved, manipulated, and compiled by anyone with access to a 
personal computer and a phone line. After reviewing current thinking on the future of 
information in war, we determined that any information strategy or policy must address, 
at a minimum, the areas of perception management, system destruction, and information 
exploitation. 
To provide a theoretical foundation, we defined information and information 
operations by first examining how information becomes understanding. The IO 
Information Pyramid illustrated this process. We then defined information operations and 
discussed how IO could be used in conjunction with military operations to meet national 
security goals. Specifically, this thesis proposed a National Information Strategy, similar 
in use as the National Security Strategy, to provide direction to all the departments and 
agencies in the U.S. government on the informational aspect of national power.  
A National Information Strategy would coordinate the message the government is 
trying to send to all the audiences interested in a particular issue. We discussed how the 
information strategy would have to be flexible, scalable, and adaptable to address the 
myriad of different situations. The strategy would provide direction about: 1) the message 
to be passed, 2) the intended audience(s), 3) the unintended audience(s), 4) how to pass 
the message, and 5) how to prevent an opponent from doing the same with their message.   
Next we looked at how to use the 17 IO capabilities. First we divided the 
capabilities into the four categories: information assurance, wetware standardization, 
deny/disrupt/destroy operations, and perception management.  Then we examined each 
category discussing each capability and how it could be used to meet the IO objectives 
and goals of the campaign at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.  
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Armed with a concept of how to use each IO capability, we needed to identify the 
way to plan to use IO. Current joint publications provide only operational and tactical-
level planning guidance for military organizations. There is no method or tool to assist in 
the comprehensive planning of IO at the strategic level. So we looked to business for a 
method or model that might apply. We took a marketing planning methodology and with 
a little modification, we were able to include all the planning elements necessary for IO.   
To validate our new methodology, we compared it to how the Administration 
reacted in the infosphere to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. From the 
speeches, press conferences, interviews, and policy statements, the Administration 
seemed to use a similar methodology as in our planning methodology. The only shortfall 
we identified in the Administration’s response was the mix of IO capabilities. So we 
designed a method to determine which IO capabilities were the most applicable to the 
target and incidental audiences.  
After completing the IO capabilities mix analysis, we determined that the national 
security community, including the Department of Defense, limited themselves to CNE, 
CNA, some PSYOP and EW based on publicly reported accounts of the resulting military 
operations.  We concluded that this narrow focus prevented the U.S. from receiving the 
full benefit of the other capabilities and it limited the “range” of IO to only one third of 
the potential target audiences of the world. 
B. CONCLUSIONS  
The lack of understanding of what information is and the diffuse characteristics of 
the infosphere may have prevented the U.S. from leveraging all of its capabilities in times 
of conflict. The U.S. response to the terrorist attacks on “9/11” focused on the technology 
and deny/disrupt/destroy, and some of the perception management paradigms. But the 
attempts at perception management were not done skillfully (e.g., calling the U.S. 
response a “crusade”). These types of missteps required time to overcome. Additionally, 
the United States and its allies missed many opportunities to affect the “battle of the 
story” by not properly identifying all the target audiences and not considering the effects 
of its message on the unintended audiences.  
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Many of the problems identified are a result of the lack of national-level direction 
for the informational capabilities of the country. Current informational goals are 
encapsulated within the National Security Strategy, but they only focus on the 
information infrastructure of the country and are mute about perception management. 
This thesis proposes two tools to address these problems: a National Information Strategy 
and an IO strategy methodology.  
1. A National Information Strategy 
To demonstrate the importance of information, a separate National Information 
Strategy (NIS) could be written to provide specific informational objectives and goals for 
all the departments and agencies of the U.S. government. The current method of putting 
some informational objectives and goal in the National Security Strategy (NSS) does not 
adequately highlight the importance of information in today’s environment. A NIS would 
provide direction at the macro level for information and it would emphasize the use of all 
17 of the IO capabilities available to the United States. The NIS, like the NSS, would be 
written as a summary of the national interests and values to clarify national policies and 
policy statements specifically about information (see Figure 23). 
The NIS would then be used by each department and agency to craft their own 
information strategies. By using this method, every organization would be in 
synchronization with the Administration. The NIS process would allow the 
Administration to learn how each department or agency plans to implement the national 
information policies.  
The DOD would create a National Military Information Strategy (NMIS) 
outlining how the military IO capabilities would be used to meet the national information 
goals. As a separate document from the National Military Strategy, the NMIS would 
highlight the importance of information and the need for the services to address all of the 
IO capabilities in their doctrine, plans, programs and budgeting. Theater commanders 
would then use the NMIS to develop their theater IO strategies and plans, guaranteeing 
alignment with the Administration’s informational objectives and goals.  
The National Information Strategy would address a three- to five-year period like 
the National Security Strategy, but there would be a process to issue Addenda to the 
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strategy in response to crises or emerging technologies that alter the NIS. The Addenda 
would be used by the Administration to provide timely informational direction to the 
departments and agencies. It would not be used as a public affairs type notice; the 
Addenda would provide informational policy guidance to the government’s departments 
and agencies concerning the particular issue or event.  
A National Information Strategy concept would prevent the conflicting “official 
positions” that are often encountered in the midst of a crisis. This happens because one 
agency states a position and then another states a different position causing great 
confusion as to where the United States really stands on an issue. This type of confusion 
can merely be embarrassing to the Administration or it could cause an adversary to 
misunderstand our intent in a crisis. 





















2. Information Strategy Methodology  
The IO planning methodology presented in Chapter III is a simple but effective 
tool that anyone who is developing IO strategy can use. It provides a checklist approach 
to the key areas and concepts to be considered in the formulation of an information 
strategy. This ensures no area is missed and the resulting strategy is broad enough to 
allow creative execution and innovation, but bounded enough to focus any effort taken in 
support of the strategy. The following excerpt from the Public Diplomacy section of A 
National Security Strategy for the Next Century is an example of how the boundaries of a 
strategy are presented, 
Effective use of our nation’s information capabilities to counter 
misinformation and incitement, mitigate inter-ethnic conflict, promote 
independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and 
support democratic participation helps advance U.S. interests abroad. (“A 
National Security Strategy”, 1999, p. 6) 
In this case, it should be relatively easy for the State Department to take this 
macro level direction and craft its own information strategy so its public diplomacy 
efforts meet the objectives and goals presented in the National Security Strategy or in a 
National Information Strategy as previously suggested.  
These two tools, a National Information Strategy and the IO planning method 
may allow the U.S. to effectively use all of it superior information capabilities in support 
U.S. interests and allow the country to keep the lead in the global “battle of the story.”    
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As this thesis progressed numerous ideas for further research emerged. Below is a 
list of only a few of them that could have the most impact on the evolution of information 
operations doctrine, and practice. 
• Use the composite matrix concept as the situation analysis tool to assess 
the strategic information environment. 
• Are there any lessons to be learned from past implementations of 
centralized information or theme processes? Does centralization eliminate 
creativity and innovation?   
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• How would a National Information Strategy affect the relationships 
among public affairs, intelligence, and operations in the military? 
• At what point could the National Military Information Strategy and the 
National Military Strategy be integrated into a single document? Which 
would take precedence? 
• How should military officers be educated about strategic information 
operations and its planning process? Would training be sufficient? 
• Create the sub-area questions for the IO planning method steps and 
compile them into what could become a joint publication. 
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY 
Civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or 
exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of 
operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. 
Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions 
normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, 
during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also  occur, if directed, in the 
absence of other military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02) 
Computer network attack. Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and 
networks themselves. Also called CNA. (This term and its definition are approved for 
inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) 
Computer network exploitation.  Intelligence collection and enabling operations 
to gather data from target adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks. 
Also called CNE. (This term and its definition has been taken from the Draft DoD 
Directive 3600.1, Oct 2001). 
Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect 
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by 
or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 
persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02) 
Data management: The control of data handling operations--such as acquisition, 
analysis, translation, coding, storage, retrieval, and distribution of data--but not 
necessarily the generation and use of data. (Institute for Telecommunication Sciences, 
Boulder, CO. Available at http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-010/_1432.htm) 
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Deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, 
distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his 
interests. (JP 1-02)  
Electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and 
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also 
called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, 
electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of 
electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation 
weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, 
neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) 
actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of 
weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive 
mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams, or anti-radiation weapons). 
b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to 
protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy 
employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat 
capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic 
warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander 
to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional 
radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, 
electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions 
involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat 
avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be 
used to produce signals intelligence, both communications intelligence, and electronic 
intelligence. (JP 1-02) 
Information assurance: Information operations (IO) that protect and defend 
information and information systems (IS) by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
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capabilities. (Institute for Telecommunication Sciences, Boulder, CO. Available at   
http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/projects/devglossary/_information_assurance.html) 
Information superiority. The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do 
the same. (JP 1-02) 
Infosphere. The infosphere refers to the rapidly growing global network of 
military and commercial command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems 
and networks linking information data bases and fusion centers that are accessible to the 
warrior anywhere, anytime, in the performance of any mission. (JP 6-0) 
Perception management — Actions to convey and/or deny selected information 
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective 
reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official 
estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the 
originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth 
projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations. See 
also psychological operations. (JP 1-02) 
Psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-
02) 
Public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community 
relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in 
the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02) 
Special information operations. Information operations that by their sensitive 
nature, due to their potential effect or impact, security requirements, or risk to the 
national security of the United States, require a special review and approval process. Also 
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